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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, controversy has plagued Illinois courtrooms over the role
defendants continue to play in the litigation after they settle with the plaintiff.1 Plaintiffs and defendants alike have questioned whether during trial
1. See, e.g., Leonardi v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 450 (Ill. 1995) (questioning whether evidence of the conduct of settled defendants may be submitted by the re-
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the remaining defendants may submit evidence of the settled defendants’
culpability,2 and whether settled defendants are still “defendants sued by
the plaintiff,”3 to be included on jury verdict forms for apportioning fault.4
In its 2008-2009 term, the Illinois Supreme Court decided two cases
that purportedly answered these questions: Nolan v. WEIL-McLain5 (Nolan)
held that a remaining defendant who alleges zero culpability in any tort
action may submit evidence of settled defendants’ conduct in support of the
defendant’s sole proximate cause defense,6 and Ready v. United/Goedecke
Services, Inc.7 (Ready I)8 held that settled defendants cannot be included on
jury verdict forms when apportioning fault.9
While these two decisions should have cleared up the controversy surrounding the role defendants may have in the litigation after settling, they
did not. The Ready I decision held that settled defendants may not be included on the jury verdict form under any circumstance.10 The Nolan decision, however, effectively disarms the Ready I decision, because a jury,
having been exposed during trial to evidence of the conduct of settled defendants, will inevitably take that evidence into consideration when apportioning fault, despite the fact the settled defendants’ names do not appear on
the jury verdict form, and notwithstanding instructions from the judge to
disregard the evidence.11
Another reason for the continuing controversy–the Ready I decision is
unjust in its application, because it does not allow the jury to properly distribute the blame among all responsible parties, which results in an unrealismaining defendants); see also Blake v. Hy Ho Rest., 652 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(questioning whether settled defendants may be included on jury verdict forms).
2. Leonardi, 658 N.E.2d at 454.
3. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2009).
4.
Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733 N.E.2d 874, 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
5. 910 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. 2009).
6. Id. at 564. The sole proximate cause defense is also known as the “empty chair
defense.” Leonardi, 658 N.E.2d at 455.
7. 905 N.E.2d 725 (Ill. 2008), modified on denial of reh’g, (March 23, 2009).
8.
The Ready case was reheard by the Illinois Supreme Court early in 2010, and
the published decision was released on Oct. 21, 2010. Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc.,
No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244 (Ill. Oct. 21, 2010). For clarity, Ready I will refer to the
2008 decision that was modified in 2009, and Ready II will refer to the 2010 decision.
9. 905 N.E.2d at 734.
10. Id. at 733.
11. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury .
. . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”); see also Jonathan D. Casper &
Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE THE J UROR, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUROR DECISION MAKING, 65, 68 (Reid Hastie ed. 1993) (“[Jurors] cannot erase previously
learned information. . . . Furthermore, direct instructions to ignore the potentially biasing
information rarely work.”).
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tic distribution of fault among the remaining defendant/s and the plaintiff/s.
This result is in direct contravention to the Illinois Legislature’s purpose for
creating the joint and several liability statute,12 which is to protect the minimally culpable defendant from having to pay the entire amount of damages.13
This Note focuses on the combined ramifications of the Ready I and
Nolan decisions, and argues that the Ready I decision should be overturned
in order to allow settled defendants to be included on the jury verdict form,
so that a proper distribution of fault may be achieved.14 By including settled
defendants in the process of apportioning fault, the courts will be keeping
with both the original intent of the Illinois Legislature, and will be keeping
with precedent set by earlier Illinois Supreme Court decisions.15
This Note further argues that the Nolan decision creates an unfair
loop-hole in the Ready I decision for minimally culpable defendants who
allege no culpability and utilize the sole proximate cause defense. This is
because the jury, once presented with evidence of the conduct of settled
defendants, will apportion fault according to all the available evidence, despite the fact that the settled defendants’ names do not appear on the jury
verdict form.16
Accordingly, this Note suggests that the sole proximate cause instruc17
tion should be disallowed in Illinois courts, as the instruction provides a
12. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2009).
13.
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1032-34 (Ill. 2002); see
also Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 746 (Ill. 2008) (Garman, J.
dissenting) (stating that “imposing excessive liability on a minimally responsible defendant
. . . is not consistent with the public policy of this state as expressed by the legislature.”).
14. See supra note 8; see also discussion on this decision infra pp. 17-18.
15. See Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1032-34; see also 5/2-1117.
16. See supra note 11.
17. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, §§ 12.04, 12.05 (2009).
More than one person may be to blame for causing an injury.
If you decide that a [the] defendant[s] was [were] negligent
and that his [their] negligence was a proximate cause of injury
to the plaintiff, it is not a defense that some third person who is
not a party to the suit may also have been to blame.
[However, if you decide that the sole proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff was the conduct of some person other than
the defendant, then your verdict should be for the defendant.]
Id.
If you decide that a [the] defendant[s] was [were] negligent
and that his [their] negligence was a proximate cause of injury
to the plaintiff, it is not a defense that something else may also
have been a cause of the injury.
[However, if you decide that the sole proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff was something other than the conduct of
the defendant, then your verdict should be for the defendant.]
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backdoor to allowing the jury to consider the fault of settled defendants,
and because it is nonsensical for a court not to allow a jury to apportion
some fault to named settled defendants, but to allow a jury to apportion all
the fault to an unnamed entity.18 Rather, given a sufficient showing of evidence by the remaining defendant, settled defendants should be included on
the jury verdict form in order to allow for an equitable distribution of fault
among all responsible parties. The distribution of fault on the jury verdict
form should not result in payment from the settled defendants,19 nor should
it result in settled defendants being burdened with unnecessary discovery
costs,20 but rather it will allow for a more equitable appraisal of whom exactly is to blame, so that the remaining defendant and plaintiff are not left
holding a substantial portion of unwarranted fault.
In Part II, this note provides a history of the Illinois joint and several
liability statute,21 an overview of the case law emanating from that statute
leading up to the Ready I decision, and the facts of the Ready I case. Part II
also provides information regarding the sole proximate cause instruction,22
how defendants utilize the sole proximate cause defense, and the facts of
the Nolan case.
Part III provides an analysis of why the Ready I court decided the case
incorrectly, ramifications of the Ready I decision, and an explanation of
why the new law simply will not work in light of the Nolan decision.
Part IV argues that the existing law should be revised to allow for an
equitable apportionment of fault by placing settled defendants on the jury
verdict form, and argues that the sole proximate cause instruction should be
removed from Illinois courts.
Part V concludes by emphasizing that the joint and several liability
statute was intended to protect the minimally liable defendant, and only
through the reversal of the Ready I decision and the removal of the sole
proximate cause instruction will the minimally liable defendant receive that
protection.

Id.

18. Compare Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 733 (Ill. 2008)
(holding that named settled defendants cannot be listed on the jury verdict form), with Nolan
v. WEIL-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 562 (Ill. 2009) (stating that a sole proximate cause instruction is a defense that establishes “proximate cause in the act of solely another not
named in the suit”).
19. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/2(d) (2009). This statute is part of the Contribution
Act, which is codified at 740 ILL. COMP. S TAT. 100/0.01-5 (2009).
20. See Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733 N.E.2d 874, 885 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000).
21. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2009).
22. See supra note 17.
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BACKGROUND

THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY STATUTE

Section 735 ILCS 5/2-111723 (2-1117) of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure24 deals with apportionment of fault, and prescribes the formula
for determining joint and several liability: any defendant found to be twenty-five percent or more culpable will be jointly and severally liable; any
defendant found to be less than twenty-five percent culpable will be only
severally liable.25 In passing section 2-1117 as part of the Tort Reform Act
of 1986,26 the Illinois Legislature intended to modify the common law rule
of joint and several liability so that a defendant who was minimally at fault

23. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2009). Formerly known as Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991,
ch. 110, § 2-1117; part of the “Tort Reform Act of 1986,” the statute became effective November 25, 1986 through Pub. Act 84-1431, Art. 5, § 1. It was later amended by Pub. Act
89-7–the “Tort Reform Act of 1995.” Pub. Act 89-7 was later held to be unconstitutional by
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1064 (Ill. 1997). The statute was again
amended by Pub. Act 93-10, § 5 and Pub. Act 93-12, § 5, which became effective on June 4,
2003.
Although the Ready I court decided that the 1986 version of 2-1117 was in
effect at the time of plaintiff’s accident, Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 729, the court decided that the
current version, amended in 2003 and included below, also does not allow for settling defendants to be included on the jury verdict form. Id. at 734.
Except as provided in Section 2-1118, in actions on account of
bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based
on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability,
all defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable for
plaintiff’s past and future medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier
of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the
plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third
party defendant except the plaintiff’s employer, shall be severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault ,
as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total
fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the
plaintiff, and any third party defendants except the plaintiff’s
employer, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other
damages.
§ 2-1117.
24. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 (2009).
25. Id. at § 2-1117.
26.
Tort Reform Act of 1986, Pub. Act 84-1431 Art. 5, § 1, 1986, Ill. Laws 3756,
formerly codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, § 2-111; see also R. Courtney Hughes,
Several Liability and the Structural Work Act, 82 ILL. B.J. 608, 608 (1994).
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would not be required to pay the entire amount of the plaintiff’s nonmedical damages.27
Under the common law, before the Tort Reform Act of 1986 was
passed, culpable defendants were held to be jointly and severally liable,
regardless of their respective shares of liability.28 Accordingly, the plaintiff
could recover the full amount of damages from any or all of the defendants,
even if the defendant’s liability was comparatively low.29 The reasoning
behind this policy was to overly burden a partially liable defendant as opposed to under-compensating an innocent plaintiff.30
Illinois has been working towards fair apportionment of fault among
all responsible parties since 1977, when the Illinois Supreme Court abrogated the law of contributory negligence31 in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.32 The court in Skinner recognized contribution
among joint tortfeasors, and began the process of apportioning liability according to the party’s fault.33 The Illinois Supreme Court’s view on fair
apportionment of fault was clear: “There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto
one alone . . . while the latter goes scot free.”34
The next step towards fair apportionment of fault came in 1981 when,
in Alvis v. Ribar,35 the Illinois Supreme Court decided to allocate fault on a
percentage basis among the defendants and the plaintiffs.36 This adoption of
“pure” comparative negligence37 as a means of distributing fault indicated a
27.
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ill. 2002). The
twenty-five percent rule does not apply to medical payments; any defendant found liable for
any amount is jointly and severally liable for the entirety of the medical bills. See id. at 1029.
28.
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1084 (Ill. 1997) (citing 3 F.
HARPER, F. J AMES & O. GRAY, TORTS §§ 10.1, 10.2 (2d ed.1986) and W. KEETON,
PROSSER & K EETON ON TORTS §§ 47, 50-52 (5th ed.1984).
29. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983).
30. R. Courtney Hughes, Several Liability and the Structural Work Act, 82 ILL. B.J.
608, 608 (1994).
31.
Under a contributory negligence system, a plaintiff’s own negligence would
preclude him from recovering damages; “the rule in Illinois was indivisible recovery – a
plaintiff recovered all from a defendant or nothing.” David B. Mueller & Jennifer L. Wolfe,
The Ready Answer: Settling Defendants’ Fault Can’t Be Used to Determine Joint Liability,
97 ILL. B.J. 294, 295 (2009).
32. 374 N.E.2d 437 (Ill. 1977).
33. Id. at 442; The Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act was codified by 740 ILL.
COMP. S TAT. 100/1 (2009).
34. Skinner, 374 N.E.2d at 442 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, H ANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS §50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971)).
35. 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981).
36. Id. at 898.
37. See id. at 897 for a comprehensive discussion of “pure” versus “modified”
comparative negligence.
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clear movement in Illinois towards ensuring that losses were accurately
distributed among all responsible parties.38
Unfortunately, as the little boy stuck one of his chubby fingers into a
crack in the leaky dam, another leak sprung forth; in becoming a comparative fault state, the question arose as to whether the common law of joint
liability39 was still applicable.40 It did not seem fair to find a defendant
jointly liable for a plaintiff’s damages now that the courts were accurately
dividing liability among all culpable parties.41 However, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that comparative fault did not eliminate joint liability,42
pointing to many other states that retained both simultaneously.43
But, the Illinois Legislature was not convinced that potential defendants were being adequately protected. Thus, for the next three years the
legislature debated and passed a number of amendments to the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure that became collectively known as the Tort Reform Act
of 1986.44 Modified comparative negligence45 and modified joint and several liability46 were two modern Illinois jurisprudential tenets borne out of the
Tort Reform Act of 1986.47
38.
Eileen M. Walsh & Eugene G. Doherty, Section 2-1117: Several Liability’s
Effect on Settlement and Contribution, 79 ILL. B.J. 122, 123 (1991).
39. Coney v. JLG Indus., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983) (“The common law doctrine of joint and several liability holds joint tortfeasors responsible for the plaintiff's entire
injury, allowing plaintiff to pursue all, some, or one of the tortfeasors responsible for his
injury for the full amount of the damages.”).
40. See id. at 204-06.
41. See Mueller & Wolfe, supra note 31, at 295.
42.
The Coney court gave four reasons for not eliminating joint liability: (1) “The
feasibility of apportioning fault on a comparative basis does not render an indivisible injury
‘divisible’ for purposes of the joint and several liability rule;” (2) “In those instances where
the plaintiff is not guilty of negligence, he would be forced to bear a portion of the loss
should one of the tortfeasors prove financially unable to satisfy his share of the damages;”
(3) “Even in cases where a plaintiff is partially at fault, his culpability is not equivalent to
that of a defendant. The plaintiff's negligence relates only to a lack of due care for his own
safety while the defendant's negligence relates to a lack of due care for the safety of others;
the latter is tortious, but the former is not;” and (4) “Elimination of joint and several liability
would work a serious and unwarranted deleterious effect on the ability of an injured plaintiff
to obtain adequate compensation for his injuries.” Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 205.
43. Id. at 206 (“We find nothing in Alvis . . . nor have we found persuasive judicial
authority for the proposition that comparative negligence compels the abolition of joint and
several liability.”).
44.
Tort Reform Act of 1986, Pub. Act 84-1431, art. 5, § 1, 1986, Ill. Laws 3756,
formerly codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, § 2-1117.
45. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1116 (2009). This statute changed Illinois from
a “pure” comparative negligence state to a “modified” comparative negligence state–
consequently, a plaintiff could only be barred from recovery, if contributory negligence was
found to be fifty-one percent or more. See id.
46. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1117 (2009). This statute limited joint liability
for non-medical damages to only those defendants who were found to be twenty-five percent
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Over the following years, the courts looked to the joint and several liability statute48 to determine whether settled defendants and other parties
were considered when apportioning fault, and decided this issue in a number of ways dependent on the specific circumstances surrounding each
case.49 With few exceptions, the case law has a distinct theme: protect minimally culpable defendants from having to pay entire damages awards.50
In Alvarez v. Fred Hintze Construction,51 the appellate court held that
a remaining defendant does not forfeit her rights under 2-1117 simply because the other defendants settled.52 Quoting an Illinois Bar Journal article,
the Alvarez court stated, “[T]he jury should still be able to assess the defendant's relative culpability, and if the defendant's level of fault falls below
the 25 percent threshold, its liability is several only and is not affected by
the plaintiff's settlement with the other tortfeasor.”53
Following this line of reasoning, the Illinois Supreme Court in Lannom
v. Kosco54 pointed to the decision in Alvarez with approval, additionally
noting that 2-1117 does not prohibit the dismissal of settling defendants or
third-party defendants, if that dismissal is otherwise appropriate.55 Allowing
a defendant, however, to reach a good-faith settlement with the plaintiff and
allowing the jury to assess that settling defendant’s culpability relative to
the other defendants’ culpability when apportioning fault, are not mutually
exclusive allowances.56 It is notable that this decision was reached after the
court had already dismissed the counts against plaintiff’s employer, leaving
only one remaining defendant.57 Therefore, when the court spoke about
percent or more liable for the plaintiff’s injuries; a defendant whose liability was found to be
twenty-four percent or less was only severally liable for non-medical expenses. See also
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1036 (Ill. 2002) (discussing the
purpose of a modified joint and several liability statute).
47. See Mueller & Wolfe, supra note 31, at 295.
48. § 5/2-1117.
49. Compare Blake v. Hy Ho Rest., Inc., 652 N.E.2d 807, 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(rejecting the argument that settled defendants should be included on the jury verdict form
for purposes of apportioning fault), with Banovz v. Rantanen, 649 N.E.2d 977, 985 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995) (holding that a settlement agreement does not abolish the remaining defendant’s
right to apportionment under 2-1117).
50. See, e.g., Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1033.
51. 617 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
52. Id. at 826.
53. Id. (quoting Eileen M. Walsh & Eugene G. Doherty, Section 2-1117: Several
Liability’s Effect on Settlement and Contribution, 79 ILL. B.J. 122, 125 (1991)) (citing Michael A. Pope & Jamie S. Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 839, 845-46
(1986)).
54. 634 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill. 1994).
55. Id. at 1101.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1099.
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assessing the “relative culpability”58 of the remaining defendants, the court
could only have intended that settled defendants be included in the final
assessment of fault.59 Assessing a defendant’s culpability relative only to
himself or to only the plaintiff would not produce results consistent with the
legislature’s original intent–to provide protection to the minimally responsible defendant.60
Conversely, Blake v. Hy Ho Restaurant, Inc.61 held that settling defendants generally should not be included in the fault apportionment for purposes of determining several liability under 2-1117.62 The appellate court in
Blake read the opposite meaning into 2-1117 than the supreme court had in
Lannom, holding that once a defendant settles, he ceases to be a defendant
for purposes of apportionment as prescribed by 2-1117.63 In the words of
the Blake court: “To read dismissed defendants into section 2-1117 and
require that they be apportioned fault after their dismissal would be a gross
contortion of the legislative intent.”64
The ruling in Blake does not seem to have been what the Illinois Legislature had in mind, however, because the very same year Blake was decided, the legislature amended 2-1117 to say exactly the opposite of what
the Blake court had just unequivocally stated the legislature’s intent to be.65
58. Id. at 1101.
59.
Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d
725, 725 (Ill. 2008) (No. 1-04-1762), 2007 WL 6822738 at *19.
60. Id.; see also Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ill.
2002).
61. 652 N.E.2d 807, 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
62. Id. at 811.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Tort Reform Act of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, § 2-1117 (1995) (codified at
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. A NN. 5/2-1117 (1995)). 89-7 was later held to be unconstitutional
by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1088 (Ill. 1997).
(a) In any action brought on account of death, bodily injury to
person, or physical damage to property in which recovery is
predicated upon fault as defined in Section 2-1116, a defendant is severally liable only and is liable only for that proportion of recoverable economic and non-economic damages, if
any, that the amount of that defendant's fault, if any, bears to
the aggregate amount of fault of all other tortfeasors, as defined in Section 2-1116 [See infra note 68], whose fault was a
proximate cause of the death, bodily injury, economic loss, or
physical damage to property for which recovery is sought.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), in any
healing art malpractice action based on negligence or wrongful
death, any defendants found liable shall be jointly and severally liable if the limitations on non-economic damages in Section 2-1115.1 of this Act are for any reason deemed or found
to be invalid.
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This amended statute made clear that on which the original statute was foggy–the legislature intended that settled defendants should be included in the
apportionment of fault.
Public Act 89-7 (89-7), as part of the Tort Reform Act of 1995, codified proportional several liability and got rid of joint liability except in
“healing art malpractice action[s].”66 The preamble to 89-7 stated firmly
that “it is the public policy of this State that a defendant should not be liable
for damages in excess of its proportional share of fault.”67 In accordance
with this policy, the wording of the original statute was completely changed
in order to apportion fault according to the “aggregate amount of fault of all
other tortfeasors.”68 This included settled defendants.69
Two years later, in Best v. Taylor Machine Works,70 the Illinois Supreme Court held 89-7 to be wholly unconstitutional because section 21115.171 (another section of 89-7) capped damages awards at five hundred
thousand dollars per plaintiff,72 which the Illinois Supreme Court previously held to be unacceptable.73 Since section 2-1117(b) relied upon section 21115.1,74 and because 2-1117(b) was not able to be severed from 2-1117(a),
the court ruled that 89-7 in its entirety was unconstitutional.75 The court
also noted that the amended version of 2-1117, which abolished joint and

Pub. Act No. 89-7, § 2-1117.
66.
Pub. Act No. 89-7, § 2-1117(b) (1995) (codified at ILL. COMP. S TAT. ANN. 5/21117(b) (1995)).
67. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1088.
68.
Tort Reform Act of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, (1995). 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-1116 (2009) defines “tortfeasor” as
Any person, excluding the injured person, whose fault is a
proximate cause of the death, bodily injury to person, or physical damage to property for which recovery is sought, regardless of whether that person is the plaintiff's employer, regardless of whether that person is joined as a party to the action,
and regardless of whether that person may have settled with
the plaintiff.
§ 5/2-1116.
69. See § 5/2-1116.
70.
689 N.E.2d 1057, 1057 (Ill. 1997).
71. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1115.1 (2009).
72. Id. Amended section 2-1117(b) relied upon section 2-1115.1, so when the court
ruled 2.1115.1 unconstitutional, it was only logical that 2-1117 must also be unconstitutional. See 735 ILL. COMP. S TAT. A NN. 5/2-1117(b) (2009); see also Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1087.
73. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1087.
74. See Tort Reform Act of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7 § 2-1117 (1995) (codified at
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. A NN. 5/2-1117 (1995)). Later Public Act 89-7 was held to be unconstitutional by Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1088.
75. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1087. Public Act 89-7 also included amendments to section
2-1116. See Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 732 (Ill. 2008).
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several liability, also directly conflicted with the existing Workers Compensation Act,76 which allowed joint and several liability.77
After 89-7 was held to be unconstitutional, the courts resorted to the
original wording of 2-1117.78 However, 89-7 continues to influence the
courts’ decisions, including the Ready I decision, where the plaintiff argued
that the amendment to 2-1117, which included settling defendants in the
apportionment of fault, “is a strong indication that the 1986 version . . . was
not intended to include such defendants.”79 In between 89-7 and the Ready I
decision, however, the courts still were undecided as to whether settled
defendants should be included on jury verdict forms for purposes of apportioning fault.80
In 2000, the appellate court in Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co.81
held that the trial court was correct when it included two of the settled defendants on the jury verdict form so that the jury could consider their alleged negligence when apportioning fault.82 The appellate court stated that
“inclusion of nonparties and settling defendants on the verdict form helps
protect the plaintiff's right to an appropriate attribution of his own fault, as
well as protecting the defendants' interests in their right to contribution.”83
In Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp.,84 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that 2-1117 made it clear that minimally responsible defendants
should not have to pay entire damages awards.85 In this case, the jury found
the defendant/employer to be ninety-nine percent responsible and the other
defendant to be one percent responsible.86 On appeal, the defendant/employer claimed the Worker’s Compensation Act87 provided immunity from liability in tort actions brought by its employees.88 The Illinois
76. Workers Compensation Act, 740 ILL. COMP. S TAT. ANN. 100/4 (2009).
77. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1085.
78. See, e.g., Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 732; Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783
N.E.2d 1024, 1029 n.1 (Ill. 2002).
79. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 733.
80. Compare Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733 N.E.2d 874, 886 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2000) (allowing settled defendants to be included on the jury verdict form), with Yoder
v. Ferguson, 885 N.E.2d 1060, 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (disallowing settled defendants
from being included on the jury verdict form).
81. 733 N.E.2d 874, 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
82. Id. at 886.
83. Id. at 885.
84.
783 N.E.2d 1024, 1024 (Ill. 2002).
85. Id. at 1033.
86. Id. at 1029.
87. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/5(a) (West 2000) (“No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer . . . for injury or death sustained by any
employee . . . other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee
who is covered by the provisions of this Act.”).
88. Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1032.
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Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this theory, stating that the immunity provided by the Worker’s Compensation Act must be raised as an
affirmative defense, which the defendant/employer had failed to do.89 The
supreme court declared that the legislature intended to apportion fault to all
responsible parties; ignoring the defendant who was ninety-nine percent
responsible for plaintiff’s injuries, while forcing the defendant who was one
percent responsible to pay for all the damages, was clearly out of step with
the intent of the legislature when they created 2-1117.90
The decision in Unzicker led to the 2003 amendment of 2-1117, which
specifically prevented a plaintiff’s employer from being considered when
apportioning fault.91 This was due to the confusion caused when trying to
apply both 2-1117 and the Workers’ Compensation Act.92 As it stands now,
the language contained in section 2-1117 limits apportionment of fault to
three parties: the plaintiff, defendants sued by the plaintiff, and third-party
defendants.93 This does not include employers or non-parties.94 The phrase
“defendants sued by the plaintiff”95 is ambiguous, however, as to whether
this includes defendants who were sued by the plaintiff but subsequently
settled, or if it only includes defendants who proceed to the point in trial
where the jury apportions fault to the remaining parties.96 This was the central issue presented to the Illinois Supreme Court in Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc.97
1.

Facts of Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc.

Michael Ready was killed when a truss fell on him from eight floors
above while working on a pipe-refitting project in Joliet, Illinois.98 Ready’s
wife, in a wrongful death action, sued three defendants: Ready’s employer–
Midwest Generation, LLC (Midwest); the general contractor of the project–
89. Id. (quoting Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (Ill. 1984)).
Pub. Act 93-10 and 93-12 § 5 (2003) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117
(2003)).
90. Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1033.
91.
Pub. Act 93-10 and 93-12 § 5 (2003) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-1117 (2003)); see also Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 729 n.2
(Ill. 2008) (limiting the allocation of fault to “the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendant except the plaintiff’s employer”).
92. See, e.g., Lilly v. Marcal Rope & Rigging, Inc., 682 N.E.2d 481, 481 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997); Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ill. 2002).
93. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. A NN. 5/2-1117 (2009); See also Elliot R. Schiff, Apportioning Liability in Third-Party Cases: Recent Issues, 93 ILL. B.J. 38, 40 (2005).
94. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2 § 2/1117.
95. Id.
96.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv, Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ill. 2008).
97. Id. at 725.
98. Id. at 727.
89
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BMW Constructors, Inc. (BMW); and the sub-contractor who performed
the scaffolding work–United/Goedecke Services, Inc (United).99
In good faith, Midwest and BMW settled with plaintiff before trial for
$1.113 million.100 United did not object to the settlement and continued to
trial alone.101 Granting plaintiff’s motion in limine,102 the trial court did not
allow United to offer any evidence of Midwest’s or BMW’s conduct in the
accident,103 and did not allow United to pursue a sole proximate cause defense.104 The trial court, in interpreting 2-1117,105 also did not include
Midwest and BMW on the jury verdict form, which would have allowed the
jury to accurately apportion fault among the three defendants and the plaintiff.106
The jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded $14.23 million in
damages.107 The jury, unaware of the two settled defendants’ conduct in the
matter, determined United to be sixty-five percent liable, which made it
jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s non-medical bills under 21117.108 The award was offset by Ready’s comparative negligence, determined to be thirty-five percent by the jury, and the $1.113 million settlement with Midwest and BMW.109 United was ultimately held liable for
$8.137 million.110
United appealed, arguing that the two settled defendants should have
been included on the jury form so that United’s liability might fall below
twenty-five percent, which, according to 2-1117, would mean that United
would only be severally liable as opposed to jointly and severally liable.111
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 727.
102.
Dowe v. Nat’l R.R. Pass. Corp., 2004 WL 887410 at *2 (N.D. Ill., 2004) (stating that “[a] motion in limine is, generally speaking, an appropriate mechanism for determining the proper scope of evidence and argument at trial”).
103. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 728. At the time of the trial court’s ruling, the courts were
still confused as to whether a defendant could present evidence of the conduct of settled
defendants in pursuit of a sole proximate cause defense. Id. This would not be made clear
until the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Nolan v. WEIL-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 564
(Ill. 2009).
104. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 728. On remand to determine whether the jury should
have been instructed on sole proximate cause, Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 911
N.E.2d 1140, 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), the appellate court reversed the Illinois Supreme
Court’s ruling, holding that the defendant could offer evidence of settled defendants. Id. at
1143. This was due to the recent ruling in Nolan. Id. at 1142.
105. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1117 (2009).
106. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 728.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ill. 2008).
111. Id.
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Agreeing with United, the appellate court reversed, holding that section 21117 allowed nonsettled defendants’ fault to be assessed in relation to settled defendants, and that evidence relating to the liability of these settled
defendants was relevant and admissible when pursuing a sole proximate
cause defense.112
Ready’s wife appealed, and after reviewing the case, the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, holding that settled defendants were not “defendants sued by the plaintiff”113 within the meaning of
section 2-1117, and thus were not to be included on the jury verdict form
when apportioning fault.114 The supreme court affirmed the appellate
court’s upholding of the amount of damages but reversed the remainder of
the appellate court’s judgment.115
Four months later, the supreme court modified the Ready I decision on
its denial of rehearing.116 The supreme court remanded the case to the appellate court for a decision as to whether the jury should have received
United’s sole proximate cause instruction.117 Presumably, this reversal took
place because the court had already heard the Nolan arguments and decided
the Nolan case in chambers but had yet to publish the decision, which it
would not do until April 16, 2009.118 The Nolan case held that in any tort
action, a defendant may present evidence relating to the culpability of the
settled defendants in pursuit of its sole proximate cause defense.119
On remand, the appellate court referred to the recent holding in Nolan
as “instructive,”120 and focused not on the trial court’s exclusion of the instruction, but rather on United’s ability to present evidence of Midwest and
BMW in pursuit of its sole proximate cause defense.121 The appellate court
held that it was wrong for the circuit court to have excluded evidence of the
conduct of Midwest and BMW.122 The appellate court then remanded the
112. Id.
113. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1117 (2009).
114. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 733-34.
115. Id. at 735. On remand to determine if United was deprived of a sole proximate
cause instruction, the appellate court reversed the supreme court due to the more recent
ruling in Nolan, which held that remaining defendants in any tort action could present evidence of settled defendants in support of their sole proximate cause defense. Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 911 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (decided on June 30,
2009).
116.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725 (Ill. 2008), modified on
denial of reh’g, (March 23, 2009).
117. Id. at 734.
118.
Nolan v. WEIL-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 549 (Ill. 2009).
119. Id. at 564.
120.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 911 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009) (decision published June 30, 2009.).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1143.
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case to the lower court for a new trial, instructing the lower court that “a
determination regarding the [sole proximate cause] instruction given [to the
jury] will depend upon the evidence adduced at retrial.”123 The case never
made it back to the trial court, however; Ready’s wife again appealed the
decision to the Illinois Supreme Court.124
Upon agreeing to review the decision, the Illinois Supreme Court was
left with the disagreeable task of turning hay into gold—it had to somehow
synthesize its Ready I decision and the Nolan decision. That is, it had to
explain how the court was able in one decision to say that a settled defendant cannot be listed on a jury verdict form for purposes of apportioning
fault,125 and then say in a subsequent decision that, in fact, they can.126
The Ready II decision that was published on October 21, 2010 turned
out to be anti-climatic, and was more noteworthy not for what it said, but
for what it did not say. The plurality opinion did not try to explain why the
sole proximate cause defense should act as an exception or loop-hole to 21117, when: 1) 2-1117 does not once mention the sole proximate cause
defense, and 2) in Ready I, the supreme court held that 2-1117 prevents
settled defendants’ culpability from being assessed relative to the culpability of the remaining defendant.127 Rather, the supreme court sidestepped that
quagmire by holding that while the trial court committed error when it prevented United from submitting evidence of the settled defendants in support
of its sole proximate cause defense, that error was harmless, and therefore
did not warrant a new trial.128 In this way, the supreme court confirmed its
decision in Nolan, thus preserving the sole proximate cause defense indefinitely.

123. Id. at 1144 (citing Leonardi v. Loyola U. of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 450, 458-59 (Ill.
1995)).
124.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244, at *3
(Ill. Oct. 21, 2010).
125.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 733-34 (Ill. 2008),
modified on denial of reh’g, (March 23, 2009).
126. See Nolan v. WEIL-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 564 (Ill. 2009); see discussion
infra Part III.B. By allowing a jury to hear evidence of the conduct of settled defendants, that
evidence inevitably plays a part when the jury apportions fault, see supra note 11; thus, the
settled defendants become “listed” on the jury verdict form.
127. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 734. But see Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No.
108910, 2010 WL 4126244, at *7-8 (Ill. Oct. 21, 2010) (Garman, J. concurring) (concurring
with the plurality opinion, but reiterating his dissent from the Ready I decision in which he
deftly argues why 2-1117, in fact, includes settled defendants).
128.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244, at *5,
*7 (Ill. Oct. 21, 2010) (holding that because there was significant evidence that United was a
proximate cause of the accident, a new jury in a new trial would undoubtedly reach the same
verdict).
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THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFENSE

In Illinois, a defendant in a civil trial has the right to assert the defense
of sole proximate cause and to offer evidence of settled defendants or nonparties in order to try to convince the judge to assign the sole proximate
cause instruction to the fact finder.129 The defendant that chooses to do so
bears the burden of proving that the single proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries was an independent event, settled defendant, or third party not
named or no longer in the suit.130 Although a defendant’s use of the sole
proximate cause defense may distract the jury from the defendant’s own
culpability, the defense does not negate the plaintiff’s burden to prove the
defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; the
plaintiff must still prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the
defendant breached that duty, the plaintiff suffered actual harm, and the
defendant’s breach was an actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries.131
Although the sole proximate cause defense and instruction have been
available for use in Illinois since as early as 1901,132 there is much controversy surrounding their usage for a variety of reasons.133 One reason is that
many dislike the defense because defendants are not required to submit an
affirmative pleading or warning that they intend to use it, 134 so plaintiffs are
oftentimes caught unaware with disastrous effects. A second reason many
dislike the defense is that the plaintiff’s burden of proof regarding causation
becomes more cumbersome when the defendant uses the defense–the plaintiff is subsequently forced to disprove unknown causes or defend nonparties to the litigation in order to prove that the defendant is culpable.135
Finally, there is the concern that instead of focusing on whether the defendant’s conduct was a contributing factor, the jury will try to figure out what

129. Id. at *5; Nolan v. WEIL-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 564 (Ill. 2009). See supra
note 17 for the text of the sole proximate cause jury instruction.
130.
Leonardi v. Loyola U. of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ill. 1995).
131. Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND S OCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 108 (4th ed. West Publishing
Co. 2001) (1985); see also Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ill. 1990) (holding that mere conjecture or speculation of defendant’s culpability is insufficient proof; a
preponderance of evidence is still necessary).
132. See, e.g., Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Harrington, 61 N.E. 622 (Ill. 1901).
133. See generally, John G. Phillips, The Sole Proximate Cause “Defense”: A Misfit
in the World of Contribution and Comparative Negligence, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 5 (1997).
134. See Leonardi, 658 N.E.2d at 455. (“A general denial of any proximate cause is
sufficient for the defendant to raise the defense.” Id. at 459.).
135. Phillips, supra note 133, at 2.
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the single cause of the injury might be and avoid the issue of defendant’s
proximate cause altogether.136
Some, however, consider the sole proximate cause defense to be a useful tool. In Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago,137 for example, the
court stated that the “sole proximate cause defense merely focuses the attention of a properly instructed jury . . . on the plaintiff’s duty to prove that
the defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.”138
Consequently, the defense is still employed, although the instruction is not
given to the jury as often as defendants would like.139 Leonardi is again
instructive–once the sole proximate cause defense is raised, “[i]f the evidence is sufficient, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on this
theory.”140 Ready II helped define “sufficient”: the sole proximate cause
instruction “should be given where there is evidence, albeit slight and unpersuasive, tending to show that the sole proximate cause of the accident
was the conduct of a party other than the defendant.”141
In Nolan v. WEIL-McLain,142 the Illinois Supreme Court found that the
remaining defendant’s evidence was sufficient for a sole proximate cause
instruction and decided the case in such a way that was not only favorable
to the remaining defendant, but favorable to all future defendants, no doubt
shaping defense strategies for years to come.143
1.

Facts of Nolan v. WEIL-McLain

During a thirty-eight year career that spanned the 1950s, 60s, 70s, and
80s, Clarence Nolan installed, repaired, and removed boilers and boiler
accessories manufactured by a number of different companies.144 Common
to this time period, these boiler accessories were largely made of asbestos.145 While cutting asbestos rope, mixing and applying asbestos cement,
and removing asbestos insulation from pipes in the course of a day’s work,

136. Id.
137. 658 N.E.2d 450, 450 (Ill. 1995).
138. Id. at 456.
139. See, e.g., Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 734 (Ill.
2008).
140. Leonardi, 658 N.E.2d at 459.
141.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244, at *5
(Ill. Oct. 21, 2010).
142. 910 N.E.2d 549, 549 (Ill. 2009).
143. Id. at 564 (holding that a defendant in any tort action may submit evidence in
support of the defendant’s sole proximate cause defense, which will likely be utilized in the
future by many defendants).
144. Id. at 550-52.
145. Id.
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Nolan breathed in a large quantity of airborne asbestos particles.146 From
this inhalation, Nolan alleged he developed mesothelioma, a respiratory
cancer previously linked to the inhalation of airborne asbestos particles.147
In 2001, Nolan and his wife filed suit against twelve different companies
whose asbestos-containing products Nolan had repeatedly worked with
during his career.148 During the course of the litigation, Nolan died of malignant mesothelioma.149 His wife carried on the suit against the twelve
defendants, a suit which had subsequently turned into a wrongful death
action.150
Over time, eleven of the twelve defendants either settled with the
plaintiff or were dismissed prior to trial.151 The remaining defendant–
WEIL-McLain–argued in a motion in limine that it should be able to
present evidence that the sole proximate cause of decedent’s death was his
exposure to asbestos-containing products of non-party entities, including
the settled defendants.152 The defendant argued that by prohibiting him
from admitting evidence of non-parties’ or settled defendants’ conduct, the
court was essentially prohibiting the jury from being allowed to consider
and weigh all the relevant evidence on its own.153 Consequently, the jury
would be forced to speculate regarding the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries,
since they were not allowed to hear all the relevant evidence.154
The circuit court ruled against the defendant’s motion in limine, although it prefaced its ruling by stating that, while there existed a “certain
unfairness”155 in not allowing the defendant to submit the evidence, they
were bound by existing law.156 The court rationalized preventing the defendant from admitting evidence of this kind because it might confuse the
jury.157 A confused jury may overlook the fact that, “one guilty of negligence cannot avoid responsibility merely because another person is guilty
of negligence contributing to the same injury . . . [e]ither or both parties are

146. Id. at 552.
147. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 553.
148. Id. at 550.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 550.
153. See id. at 555.
154. See Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 455 (Ill. 1992).
155. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 551.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., id.; see also, Kochan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 610 N.E.2d
683, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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liable for all damages sustained.”158 Because of this possibility, courts have
held that such evidence is not relevant.159
The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $2.3 million,
which was offset by the $1.2 million received in settlement.160 Defendant
filed a post-trial motion arguing that the circuit court erred in excluding all
evidence of decedent’s other exposure to asbestos-containing products.161
Although the court denied the motion, it noted that it did so reluctantly, and
that the defendant should have been able to offer the evidence.162 The court
stated it was bound by stare decisis, but that it was conflicted between what
the law should be and the current state of the law.163
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision,164 and the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.165 Defendant’s appeal presented the question as to whether the circuit court committed error by excluding all evidence of defendant’s exposure to asbestos throughout his
thirty-eight year career from products other than those of defendant.166 The
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that its earlier case law had been misinterpreted and ruled that the remaining defendant should have been able to
present evidence of the settled defendants’ and non-parties’ wrongdoing.167
In relying on Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago,168 the supreme
court allayed this dilemma by holding that a defendant in any tort action169
has the right to offer evidence of non-parties and settled parties in order to
contest proximate cause.170 According to Nolan, that evidence is relevant.171

158. This is the “Lipke Exclusionary Rule.” Lipke v. Celotex Corp., 505 N.E.2d
1213, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
159. Id.
160. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 554.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 555.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 564.
168.
658 N.E.2d 450, 450 (Ill. 1995). A medical malpractice case holding that evidence of non-parties and settled defendants may be admitted in support of defendant’s sole
proximate cause defense. Id. at 459. Lower courts were unclear as to whether Leonardi’s
holding extended to non-medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 551.
169. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 564.
170. Id. at 563.
171. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

THE EXISTING LAW UNDER READY I AND NOLAN DOES NOT PROTECT
MINIMALLY CULPABLE DEFENDANTS

In light of the Nolan and Ready I decisions, the existing law does not
protect minimally culpable defendants; it only protects non-culpable defendants.172 The legislature’s intent in passing section 2-1117–to protect minimally culpable defendants173–has not been achieved.
Under the existing law, a defendant in any tort action may submit evidence of the conduct of settled defendants to prove that he is blameless,
which is a sole proximate cause defense.174 That same defendant, however,
may not offer evidence of the conduct of settled defendants to prove that he
is only one percent to blame for plaintiff’s injuries.175 In other words, Defendant A, who is in fact one percent to blame for plaintiff’s injuries, cannot offer evidence of settled Defendant B, who is in fact ninety-nine percent
to blame, even though this restriction might result in the jury apportioning
one hundred percent of the blame to Defendant A.
The same divergence in protection exists under the laws regarding jury
instructions–the court may give the jury a sole proximate cause instruction,
which allows the jury to apportion one hundred percent of the fault to an
unnamed entity in order to relieve the remaining defendant from paying any
damages.176 On the other hand, the court will not name settled defendants
on the jury verdict form, which may very well result in the remaining defendant having to pay one hundred percent of the damages.177 The result of
the existing law is that the remaining defendant is given all or none of the
remaining liability, minus plaintiff’s comparative fault.178 This lack of any
sort of middle ground results in non-settling defendants being forced to pay
out larger sums or plaintiffs left not completely whole.179
Minimally responsible defendants should not be forced to pay entire
damage awards–this was the legislature’s intent when they passed section

172. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
173.
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ill. 2002).
174. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 564.
175. Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 734 (Ill. 2008).
176. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, §§ 12.04, 12.05 (2009).
177. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 733.
178. Compare 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (2009) (comparative negligence statute), with 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117 (2009) (joint and several liability
statute).
179. See David B. Mueller & Jennifer L. Wolfe, supra note 31 (stating that if a jury
decides that the remaining defendant is not wholly to blame, their only other alternative is to
apportion some blame to the plaintiff, regardless of her actual culpability).
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2-1117.180 Requiring a one percent responsible defendant to pay for all of
the damages while ignoring the ninety-nine percent responsible settled defendant is clearly against the legislature’s intent.181
1.

Deep-Pocketed Defendants and Plaintiffs Will Suffer Under the Ready
I Ruling

Given the ruling in Ready I, deep-pocketed defendants will be forced
to pay for the misconduct caused by other, more responsible parties.182 A
plaintiff will now be less likely to agree to a reasonable settlement with a
deep-pocketed defendant, because by keeping them in the case until the
verdict is handed down, the plaintiff is more likely to receive a larger
payout.183 Skaggs v. Senior Services of Central Illinois, Inc.184 illustrates
this flaw by pointing out that if settling defendants are not included in the
apportionment of fault under 2-1117, a plaintiff who sues two defendants
may take advantage of 2-1117 by settling with the indigent defendant who
is primarily at fault, and taking the wealthy defendant to trial.185 In this
manner the plaintiff will exploit the wealthy defendant, causing him to become jointly liable for the full amount of plaintiff’s damages, because the
settled defendant’s portion of fault can no longer be considered.186 Moreover, a minimally culpable defendant, who insists on a trial to let the jury
equitably apportion fault, will now likely be held liable for the entire
amount of the judgment due to the court’s refusal to allow the jury to assign
fault to all culpable parties.187
Under the strain of having to pay large damages awards, defendants
will pass along these costs to others by way of raising consumer costs,
which will in turn create economic inefficiency.188 The legislature did not
intend this result when it created 2-1117.189 Quite the contrary–the Illinois
General Assembly believed morality dictated that defendants should not
180.
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ill. 2002).
181. See Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244, at
*7-8 (Ill. Oct. 21, 2010) (Garman, J. concurring); see also Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 746 (Garman, J. dissenting) (stating that “imposing excessive liability on a minimally responsible
defendant . . . is not consistent with the public policy of this state as expressed by the legislature.”).
182. See Ready, 2010 WL 4126244 at *8 (Garman, J. concurring); see also Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1086 (Ill. 1997).
183. Ready, 2010 WL 4126244 at *8 (Garman, J. concurring); Ready, 905 N.E.2d at
746 (Garman, J. dissenting).
184. 823 N.E.2d 1021, 1021 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
185. Id. at 1027-28.
186. Id.
187. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 746 (Garman, J., dissenting).
188. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1086 (Ill. 1997).
189. See Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ill. 2002).
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have to pay for injuries they did not inflict.190 “Although it may seem unjust
to leave a plaintiff uncompensated for the entire loss, it may be equally unfair to require a defendant who caused a small portion of those damages to
pay them in their entirety.”191
On the other hand, if a plaintiff settles out of court with the more culpable defendants and goes to trial with the minimally culpable, deeppocketed defendant, it is quite possible that the plaintiff will be forced to
bear a larger amount of the liability, when in fact, she was minimally culpable herself.192 If, however, the fault is able to be apportioned among all of
the defendants, including those that settled, the plaintiff is more likely to be
made whole because her own share of the responsibility will be reduced.193
As the appellate court in Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co.194 aptly stated,
“Accordingly, inclusion of nonparties and settling defendants on the verdict
form helps protect the plaintiff's right to an appropriate attribution of his
own fault . . . .”195
In Bofman v. Material Service Corp.,196 the appellate court reversed a
judgment that held plaintiffs to be eighty-two percent responsible for the
negligence that caused their injuries.197 In considering the facts of the case,
the court determined that the jury had either failed to consider the fault of
settled parties or had attributed the fault of the settled parties to the plaintiff.198 In its opinion, the court stated, “Consideration of the negligence of
both parties and non-parties to an action is essential for determining liability commensurate with degree of total fault.”199 The court then went on to
explain that the purpose for considering the liability of settled tortfeasors is

190. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1086 n.7 (quoting M. Redish, The Constitutionality of Illinois Tort Reform III–The Repeal of Joint and Several Liability, IDC QUARTERLY 5, 10
(1996).
191. Id. (quoting Stephen J. O’Neil, A New Day: The Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, 9 CHIC. BAR. ASSOC. REC. 18, 20 (1995); see also Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 746
(Garman, J. dissenting) (stating that “imposing excessive liability on a minimally responsible defendant . . . is not consistent with the public policy of this state as expressed by the
legislature.”).
192. See Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733 N.E.2d 874, 885 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000).
193.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244, at *8
(Ill. Oct. 21, 2010) (Garman, J. concurring); Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905
N.E.2d 725, 746 (Ill. 2008) (Garman, J., dissenting).
194. 733 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
195. Id. at 885.
196. 466 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
197. Id. at 1070.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1072.
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to properly determine the share of plaintiff’s responsibility, not to necessarily limit the defendant’s share.200
2.

Excluding Settled Defendants from the Jury Verdict Form when Apportioning Fault Violates the Remaining Defendants’ Rights

The equal protection rights provided by the Illinois government and
the Federal Government are identical,201 and require the government to treat
similarly situated persons in a similar manner.202 This protection prohibits
the State from unequally treating people placed into different classes by a
statute for reasons unrelated to the original intent of the statute.203 Constitutional violations of equal protection may arise in the form of judicial decisions, 204 as seen here in the Ready I decision.
The Ready I decision violates minimally culpable defendants’ equal
protection rights, because the court took away the full protection of 2-1117
when it excluded settled defendants from the jury verdict form.205 In the
context of Ready I, where the persons being treated unequally are minimally culpable defendants, there is no fundamental right or suspect class involved; therefore, the scrutiny employed by the courts is mere rationality–
the decision must have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest
and be neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.206 Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp.207 made clear the original state interest of 2-1117–
minimally culpable defendants should not be responsible for the entire
amount of damages.208
Together, the ruling in Ready I and the subsequent ruling in Nolan
created two classes of similarly situated defendants–minimally culpable
defendants who are not allowed to have their culpability compared to settled defendants and non-parties,209 and minimally culpable defendants who
are allowed to have their culpability compared to settled defendants, non-

200. Id.
201. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (containing the Equal Protection
Clause), with ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (containing the equal protection clause). See also People
v. Donoho, 788 N.E.2d 707, 718 (Ill. 2003).
202.
People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 457 (Ill. 1992).
203.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
204.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972).
205. Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 733 (Ill. 2008).
206.
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n, 539 U.S. 103, 107 (2003).
207.
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2002).
208. Id. at 1033.
209. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 733.
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parties, acts of nature, etc., while alleging a sole proximate cause defense.210
Both classes of minimally culpable defendants ought to be fully protected
by 2-1117,211 keeping minimally culpable defendants severally liable only.212 As it stands now, however, only a minimally culpable defendant alleging no fault is allowed to have the jury consider the fault of settled defendants and non-parties.213 Consider the following hypothetical:
In the first scenario, the remaining defendant is minimally culpable for
the plaintiff’s injuries. After the plaintiff rests, the remaining defendant
begins by telling the jury that he played only a small role in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s injuries, and offers evidence of his own
conduct to support this claim. As the remaining defendant attempts to tell
the jury about the more culpable settled defendants’ involvement in the
accident, however, and to offer evidence of their conduct in order to prove
his own minimal culpability, the plaintiff objects. The judge rules that evidence of settled defendants is not allowed because the remaining defendant
is not presenting a sole proximate cause defense; he is only arguing that he
is minimally culpable.214 Consequently, since the jury has only been exposed to evidence relating to the remaining defendant’s conduct and the
plaintiff’s conduct, and since the jury is not aware of any other defendants
because none are listed on the jury verdict form, the jury’s allocation of
fault will not be accurate, and will result in either the defendant or the
plaintiff receiving a disproportionate percentage of the fault.
In the second scenario, the remaining defendant is minimally culpable
for plaintiff’s damages. After the plaintiff rests, the remaining defendant
begins by denying his own culpability. He builds his case on the theory that
the settled defendants’ involvement in the accident warrants full liability for
the plaintiff’s injuries and offers evidence of their conduct, which the judge
must now allow according to the new law.215 In fact, most of the remaining
defendant’s defense centers on the conduct of the settled defendants, and
how they, and not he, are to blame for the accident. This is the sole proximate cause defense.216
210.
Nolan v. WEIL-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 563 (Ill. 2009). It is important to note
that both defendant WEIL-McLain and defendant United/Goedecke pursued sole proximate
defenses. See Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 551; Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 734.
211. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2009).
212. See Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1033.
213. See Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 564.
214. See Holton v. Mem. Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1219 (Ill. 1997) (stating that in
order to receive the sole proximate cause instruction, the defendant must present evidence
that it was only the negligence of other persons that caused the plaintiff’s injuries).
215. See Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 564.
216. See Leonardi v. Loyola U. of Chic., 658 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ill. 1995) (stating that
the “defense seeks to defeat a plaintiff’s claim of negligence by establishing proximate cause
in the act of solely another not named in the suit”).
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According to the Ready I decision, when the case is handed to the jury,
the settled defendants cannot be listed on the jury verdict form for fault
apportionment purposes.217 The Illinois Supreme Court has shut the front
door on this issue.218 In light of the Nolan ruling,219 however, the back door
has been left open because by this point in the trial, the jury has already
heard and been affected by the evidence regarding the conduct of the settled
defendants. Even if the judge chooses not to give the sole proximate instruction to the jury, the jury will undoubtedly take into consideration the
evidence of the settled defendants as the jury apportions fault, regardless of
whether the settled defendant’s names appear on the jury verdict form.220
So, in effect, the settled defendants become “listed” on the jury verdict
form, thus rendering unequal protection to similarly situated, minimally
culpable defendants, which goes against both the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions.221
B.

THE EXISTING LAW UNDER READY I AND NOLAN IS UNWORKABLE IN
PRACTICE

The combination of the Nolan and Ready I rules is unworkable in
practice. As it stands now, a remaining defendant is allowed to offer evidence of settled defendants in order to prove her sole proximate cause defense,222 but is not allowed to include those remaining defendants on the
jury verdict form for the jury to apportion fault.223 Notwithstanding the rationale for the two decisions, the reality is that even if the jury verdict form
does not include the settling defendants, and even if the jury chooses not to
exercise the sole proximate cause instruction,224 the jury has still heard evidence of the settled defendants’ culpability and will apportion fault between
the remaining defendant(s) and the plaintiff(s) accordingly.
A defendant is not required to plead sole proximate cause as an affirmative defense.225 The defendant need only generally deny any proximate
cause.226 At that point, the defendant may submit competent evidence to
establish that the conduct of “a third person, or some other causative factor,

217. See Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 905 N.E.2d 725, 734 (Ill. 2008).
218. Id.
219. Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 564.
220. See supra note 11.
221. See U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
222.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244, at *5,
*7 (Ill. Oct. 21, 2010); Nolan, 910 N.E.2d at 564.
223. Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 734.
224. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, §§ 12.04, 12.05 (2009).
225.
Leonardi v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 450, 459 (Ill. 1995).
226. Id.
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is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.”227 This includes defendants who have settled.228
Based on all the evidence adduced at trial, the court makes the decision to give the jury the sole proximate cause instruction.229 All that is required for the court to extend the instruction to the jury is some evidence in
the record, “albeit slight and unpersuasive, tending to show that the sole
proximate cause of the accident was the conduct of a party other than the
defendant.”230 Moreover, the judge does not even decide whether to give
the instruction until the case is ready to be handed over to the jury.231 This
suggests that even if the judge refuses to give the sole proximate cause instruction to the jury, the jury will already have heard the evidence of the
conduct of the settled defendants.232 Even if the settled defendants are not
listed on the jury verdict form, the jury is not likely to forget the evidence
of the conduct of the settled defendants, and will undoubtedly take that evidence into consideration when apportioning percentages of fault.233
Also, consider the ramifications of the Ready I decision in a case in
which the remaining defendant does not allege a sole proximate defense.
The Ready I decision also presents a dilemma because the law, as it stands
now in light of the Ready I ruling, will only function as intended by the
Illinois Supreme Court if the defendant settles before the trial begins.234 If a
defendant decides to settle with plaintiff in good faith during the trial, or
even while the jury is deliberating, this will cause the supreme court’s ruling in Ready I to be unworkable, and will likely result in a mistrial.235
Henry v. St. John’s Hospital236 is a fine example of what can happen to
a minimally culpable defendant when the more culpable defendant settles
with the plaintiff after trial begins. In Henry, the trial ended and liability
was apportioned between two groups of defendants–group one was apportioned ninety-three percent of the $8.5 million award ($7.9 million); group
two was apportioned seven percent of the award ($600, 000).237 While the
appeal was pending, however, group one settled with the plaintiff for $3.35
227. Id.
228.
Nolan v. WEIL-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 564 (Ill. 2009).
229. See Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 911 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009) (citing Leonardi, 658 N.E.2d at 458 (“A litigant has the right to have the jury clearly
and fairly instructed upon each theory which was supported by the evidence.”)).
230.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., No. 108910, 2010 WL 4126244 at *5
(Ill. Oct. 21, 2010).
231. Ready, 911 N.E.2d at 1144.
232. See id.
233. See supra note 11.
234. See Ready, 905 N.E.2d at 747 (Garman, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. 563 N.E.2d 410 (Ill. 1990).
237. Id. at 412.
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million, which caused the second group of defendants to be responsible for
the remaining $5.15 million.238
Although this example took place during the appellate process and not
directly before trial or during trial, the principle remains the same.239 Here,
the first group of defendants settled, leaving the second group of defendants, which the jury deemed to be only seven percent responsible, to then
bear sixty-one percent of the damages award.240 Had the first group of defendants settled halfway through the trial, or even as the jury deliberated in
the back room, the same result would likely have been reached.
IV. THE EXISTING LAW MUST BE REVISED
Every trial should be an attempt to ascertain the truth of the matter.241
This is an impossible task if evidence is omitted from the trial and the jury
is kept from being made aware of all the culpable parties in the litigation. It
is also not in the spirit of truth to allow all or most of the blame to fall
squarely on the shoulders of a minimally culpable defendant. The law as
interpreted by the Ready I and Nolan decisions must be revised to allow for
an honest inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s injuries
and to allow for a legitimate apportionment of fault.
A.

THE READY I RULING SHOULD BE REVERSED

1.

Settled Defendants Should Be Included on the Jury Verdict Form in
Order to Conform with Other Legislative Policies

Illinois has adopted a statute codifying modified comparative negligence.242 By enacting this statute, the legislature envisioned a system that
would apportion fault based on the relative fault of all parties to an action.243 Subsequent judicial decisions have made it clear that the apportionment of fault in this type of system would extend to all tortfeasors in an
action.244 As the appellate court in Bofman v. Material Services245 succinctly stated, “Consideration of the negligence of both parties and nonpar238. Id. at 412-13.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 413 (calculating that $5.15 million is sixty-one percent of $8.5 million).
241.
Sears v. Rutishauser, 466 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Ill. 1984).
242. 735 ILL. C OMP. STAT. A NN. 5/2-1116 (2009); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886,
886 (Ill. 1981).
243. See Chu v. Bowers, 656 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
244. E.g., Parsons v. Carbondale Twp., 577 N.E.2d 779, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
Bofman v. Material Serv. Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1064, 1072 (Ill. App. 1984).
245. 466 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. App. 1984).
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ties to an action is essential for determining liability commensurate with
degree of total fault.”246
The Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act247 also allows parties the
right to apportion fault to all tortfeasors, including the settled defendants.248
A contribution action is simply a comparative negligence case, and determination of fault therein should be treated no differently than the determination of fault in the main action.249 The wording of the Contribution Act
itself makes clear the notion that settled defendants are to be included in the
apportionment of damages: “[W]here 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury . . . there is a right of contribution
among them, even though judgment has not been entered against any or all
of them.”250 A settled defendant’s inclusion on the jury verdict form is essential to a just resolution of third-party disputes.251 Common liability is a
percentage that must equal one hundred, and the remaining defendant’s pro
rata share cannot be fairly assessed without reference to the settled defendant’s pro rata share.252
Likewise, the Ready I decision must be reversed to include settled defendants on the jury verdict form, so that the jury may realistically apportion fault among all culpable parties and be in compliance with the Illinois’
policy of modified comparative fault and the Contribution Act.253 Accordingly, a defendant’s rights under 2-1117 should not be denied because
another defendant settles or is dismissed from the case.254 Instead, defendants should be able to have their relative culpability compared to settled
defendants and non-parties, and if the remaining defendant’s culpability
falls below twenty-five percent, then he should be severally liable only.255
In this way, fault will be apportioned appropriately, and minimally culpable
defendants will be forced to pay only for those damages commensurate
with their actual fault.256
246. Bofman, 466 N.E.2d at 1072.
247. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/0.01-5 (2009).
248.
Truszewski v. Outboard Marine Motor Corp., 685 N.E.2d 992, 996-97 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997).
249.
Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., supra note
59, at *26.
250. 740 ILL. C OMP. STAT. A NN. 100/2/(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
251. Truszewski, 685 N.E.2d at 996-97.
252. See id.
253. Contra William R. Tapella II, Comparative Fault, Contribution, and Joint and
Several Liability: An Argument Against Reconciliation, 88 ILL. B.J. 694, 694 (2000).
254.
Alvarez v. Fred Hintz Constr., 617 N.E.2d 821, 826 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
255.
Eileen M. Walsh & Eugene G. Doherty, Section 2-1117: Several Liability’s
Effect on Settlement and Contribution, 79 ILL. B.J. 122, 125 (1991).
256. See Banovz v. Rantanen, 649 N.E.2d 977, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Bofman v.
Material Serv. Corp. 466 N.E.2d 1064, 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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Moreover, 2-1117 is impotent if it does not include settled defendants;
2-1117 was created so that the harsh effects of joint and several liability
would be softened for the remaining minimally culpable defendants.257 If
settlements were allowed to keep defendants from being considered when
apportioning fault, then minimally responsible defendants would rarely, if
ever, receive protection from 2-1117.258 Unzicker proves this point–if the
employer had been allowed to settle, evidence of its ninety-nine percent
culpability would have been kept from the jury, and the remaining defendant and plaintiff would have been left holding that large portion of fault.259
2.

Settled Defendants Should Not Be Responsible for Additional Contribution

Settled defendants, who are included on jury verdict forms for purposes of apportioning fault, should not be liable for the percentage of damages
they are assigned. Including settled defendants on the jury verdict form will
not affect the Contribution Act,260 which provides that a defendant who
settles is discharged from all liability for contribution to any defendant who
is still liable.261 A jury’s inclusion of the settled defendant’s pro rata share
of liability will only facilitate the jury’s equitable assessment of the remaining defendant’s share of liability.262
On the other hand, dismissing settling defendants should not affect the
remaining defendants’ or plaintiffs’ ability to obtain the testimony of the
settling parties’ personnel, nor will a settlement keep a settled defendant’s
witnesses out of the trial.263 The district court clearly held this opinion by
stating, “The dismissal of any settling defendants will leave the plaintiffs
and the remaining defendants and third party defendants . . . completely
unhindered in presenting evidence and arguments regarding the relative
responsibility of all concerned.”264
B.

THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE ABOLISHED

The sole proximate cause instruction should be abandoned because its
entire premise is based on a fallacy: an event rarely has only one cause for
257.
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingred. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ill. 2002).
258. See id.
259. See Unzicker, 783 N.E.2d at 1024.
260. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/0.01-5 (2009).
261. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/2(d) (2009).
262. See Truszewski, 685 N.E.2d at 996.
263.
Dowe v. Nat’l R.R. Pass. Corp., No. 01 C 5808, 2004 WL 887410, at *9 n.2
(N.D. Ill., Apr. 26, 2004).
264. Id.
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its occurrence, as the instruction’s name suggests.265 In fact, modern wisdom tells us that any event rarely has only one causal antecedent; usually
the causes are numerous.266 Tort law also adheres to the principle that there
may be more than one causal factor of an injury.267 And yet, the courts are
still instructing juries to try to find a sole cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.268
This is a confusing instruction that shifts the focus of juries from whether
defendant was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries to whether a sole
proximate cause exists that the jury can point to that accounts for the entirety of the plaintiff’s injuries.269 This attempt to point to a solitary figure as
the sole cause for the plaintiff’s injuries is simply unnecessary, because a
jury need only decide whether the plaintiff’s injuries were a natural and
probable result of the defendant’s breach of duty.270 If the defendant’s actions were not at all responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, then the jury
should assign zero culpability to that defendant. This method would allow
the jury to “simply say that the defendant’s act or omission was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury and leave it at that.”271
Eliminating the sole proximate cause instruction does not mean defendants would no longer be able to defend themselves; eliminating this would
mean only that the confusing instruction would no longer be given to juries.272 Any and all defendants will still be able to claim that they were not a
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries and that someone or something
else was.273 Moreover, any defendant should still be able to submit evidence
of settled parties as Nolan dictated, despite the fact that the sole proximate
cause instruction no longer exists. It is only through an inclusion of this
evidence that the jury can fully understand the events that led to the plaintiff’s injuries and make a proper distribution of fault.
V.CONCLUSION
The role that defendants continue to play in the litigation after they
settle has been an issue of controversy in Illinois courts for quite some time.
In its 2008-2009 term, however, the Illinois Supreme Court decided two
cases–Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc.274 and Nolan v. WEIL265. Phillips, supra note 133, at 5-6.
266. Fowler V. Harper, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2 (2d ed. 1986).
267. See, e.g., Bentley v. Saunemin Twp., 413 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ill. 1980).
268. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, §§ 12.04, 12.05 (2009); see also
Phillips, supra note 133, at 2.
269. Phillips, supra note 133, at 2.
270.
Stojkovich v. Monadnock Bldg., 666 N.E.2d 704, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
271. Phillips, supra note 133, at 7.
272. Id. at 9.
273. Id.
274. 905 N.E.2d 725, 725 (Ill. 2008).
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McLain275–that were supposed to clear up the controversy. Instead, the
combination of the two cases create additional layers of confusion and inequality in the manner in which fault is distributed among remaining defendants and plaintiffs.
It is imperative, therefore, that revisions be made to existing tort law to
provide an equitable playing field for plaintiffs and defendants. First, the
Ready I decision should be reversed to allow settled defendants on the jury
verdict form so that a realistic and appropriate distribution of fault may be
reached. Second, the sole proximate cause instruction276 should be abolished from Illinois courts as it is both fallacious in nature and confusing
to jury members trying to determine the question of proximate cause. It is
only through these changes that remaining defendants and plaintiffs will
receive a portion of fault that is commensurate with their actual culpability.
BENJAMIN W. MEYER

275. 910 N.E.2d 549, 549 (Ill. 2009).
276.
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, §§ 12.04, 12.05 (2009).
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